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He who lives for the sake of combating an enemy has an interest in seeing that                              
his enemy stays alive (Nietzsche, 1996, p. 183). 
The security dilemma began as a simple but penetrating observation, which appeared 
to capture the dynamics of the dominant international security issue of its day, the Cold War. 
The concept, as generally understood, referred to how opposing actors—each regarding its 
own moves as defensive but the other’s moves as offensive—could mutually produce a spiral 
of escalating tension such as an arms race (Knutsen, 2016). Accordingly, from the 1950s, the 
security dilemma occupied a central place within (Realist-dominated) International Relations. 
In the 1990s, as scholarly and policy focus shifted to intra-state conflict, many analysts found 
the security dilemma to also be a satisfying explanation of civil strife (Posen, 1993; Walter & 
Snyder, 1999). An expansive literature explored why the security dilemma emerges at the 
intra-state level, how it unfolds, and how it may be overcome. 
But instead of increasing clarity, there is widespread confusion. For example, Booth 
and Wheeler (2008, p. 9) contended that most writers have used the term “security dilemma” 
incorrectly. Visser and Duyvesteyn (2014, p. 65) concluded that the security dilemma is 
“irrelevant” to intra-state conflict, despite numerous such applications over the previous 
twenty years. Bilgic (2013, p. 185) described what many regard as the means of identifying a 
security dilemma—classifying actor intentions as malign or benign—as “inconsequential.” 
Meanwhile, according to Tang (2011), some of the most cited analyses of the security 
dilemma are “misguided” (p. 518) and contain an “array of errors” (p. 527).  
 In light of such fundamental disagreements, these debates require critical 
reassessment with a view to salvaging and spotlighting what is of greatest analytical 
significance in security dilemma theory. This article provides a new analysis of the security 
dilemma and argues that much scholarly attention—trained on reductionist debates on single 
causes of conflict, inconclusive applications, and definitional disputes—has underappreciated 
and obscured its key insight. The security dilemma is presented, not as a variety of conflict, 
but a model of the relational dynamic inherent in all conflict, what may be called the cycle of 
insecurity. Illuminating the nature of this cycle, which is constituted by rival actors’ mutually 
reinforcing identities and postures, and the cyclical and self-defeating quality of actors’ 
quests for exclusively defined conceptions of security, is the most significant contribution of 




Through a reappraisal of the literature, the article elucidates three essential and 
interlocking dimensions of the cycle: an environment of structural uncertainty; 
interdependent collective identities; and an escalating and self-perpetuating dynamic. The 
power and validity of this threefold framework is then demonstrated by an analysis of the 
conflict in Northern Ireland, a hitherto unexplored case study in the security dilemma 
literature. The article shows how the cycle of insecurity constitutes a comprehensive and 
flexible conflict analysis tool which is of both scholarly and practical utility.   
At the outset, two points of clarification should be made. First, Tang (2009, p. 587) 
made a useful demarcation which I follow here. The “security dilemma” is “a concept for 
labelling a particular situation” while “security dilemma theory” is “the body of knowledge 
that seeks to understand the underlying causes, regulations and implications of the security 
dilemma.” Second, the cycle of insecurity argument is applicable to conflict generally, yet the 
present concern is with exploring its conditions and unfolding in what is the most common 
type of contemporary violent conflict. This, in terms of some key conceptualizations, has 
been called “protracted social conflict” (Azar, 1990), “new war” (Kaldor, 2012), or 
“transnational conflict” (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2016). These conflicts possess 
external dimensions, but state weakness or failure is at their core. Thus, the majority of 
literature with which the discussion engages examines the security dilemma in civil conflict 
and key themes therein: emerging state weakness and imperial collapse; rival identity groups 
living in close proximity; nationalist mobilization; and the threat and spread of small arms.    
The Security Dilemma 
The security dilemma is an “essentially contested concept” (Roe, 2005, p. 8). The 
source material in which many writers have searched for the “authentic” security dilemma 
has been the work of three widely acknowledged pioneers of the concept: John Herz (1950), 
Herbert Butterfield (1951), and Robert Jervis (1978), although the idea had been anticipated 
in much earlier political writings (e.g., Montesquieu, 2001, p. 241; Tolstoy, 2010, p. 75). But 
as Tang (2009, pp. 592-593) pointed out, none of the three pioneers “provided a rigorous and 
coherent definition of the security dilemma in one place.” Tang (2009; 2011) claimed to 
bring that missing rigour and coherence, setting out a composite of the work of Butterfield, 
Herz, and Jervis, and then declared invalid any understanding of the security dilemma which 
deviates from this. Yet given what Tang admitted are the inconsistencies in the pioneer 
writings, there is in truth no “real” security dilemma to be uncovered. The present purpose is 
not to suggest a new definition but to identify and synthesize the most credible and effective 




clear the ground for the subsequent argument, two unsatisfactory deployments of the security 
dilemma will be considered.   
The Security Dilemma as a Conflict Caused by Benign Intentions 
For many writers, a security dilemma is defined by the intentions of the actors 
involved. It is a situation in which actors come into conflict due only to their intention to 
protect themselves—neither side desires confrontation (Visser & Duyvesteyn, 2014; Tang, 
2009; Collins, 2004; Roe, 1999). The defensive behaviour of Actor A is interpreted by Actor 
B as offensive, Actor B increases its defences but in doing so confirms the fears of Actor A, 
and an action-reaction spiral of escalation ensues that may lead to war. If one or more actors 
have malign expansionist intentions, then the situation is not a security dilemma according to 
this understanding. It is, rather, a security or strategic threat (Visser & Duyvesteyn, 2014).  
The absence of malign intentions is the “tragic element” of conflict noted by 
Butterfield (1951): “The greatest war in history,” he wrote, “could be produced without the 
intervention of any great criminals who might be out to do deliberate harm in the world. It 
could be produced between two Powers both of which were desperately anxious to avoid a 
conflict of any sort” (pp. 19-20). While Butterfield emphasized human fallibility as a cause of 
the security dilemma, Herz (1950) stressed what is known in International Relations theory as 
the “anarchy” of the international system: the absence of a security-guaranteeing sovereign. 
This, it is argued, forces actors to assume the worst regarding others’ intentions and prepare 
accordingly.  
This security dilemma of benign intentions constitutes a kind of orthodoxy, promoted 
by some writers as being the core of the pioneer formulations. But it also has been shown to 
have dubious value, both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, constructivists have 
rejected the neo-Realist assumptions of this security dilemma, emphasising that threats are 
socially constructed by groups, not given by nature or dictated by structure. Thus, Bilgic 
(2013) and Kaufman (2006), following Wendt (1992), are less interested in whether actors 
think they are seeking their own security (they invariably do) but how they pursue and 
understand their own security: “Chauvinist leaders always claim to be driven by security 
motives, but what makes them chauvinists is that they define their group's security as 
requiring dominance over rival groups which is, naturally, threatening to the others” 
(Kaufman, 2006, p. 54). 
  Empirically, it is unlikely that such a situation as the security dilemma of benign 
intentions has ever actually occurred. Actors never have purely benign, defensive 




resentment and a prejudiced image of the other group—shape a group’s response to its 
insecurity (Snyder & Jervis, 1999). Moreover, security fears may be deliberately inflamed by 
political leaders, making it unclear what is and is not a “genuine” security fear. These factors 
cloud the distinctions between security and greed, malign and benign intentions.  
In any case, it is a difficult and highly subjective task for analysts to assess the 
motives and intentions of political actors (Bilgic, 2013), and attempts to apply this 
understanding of the security dilemma in real cases have been fraught. Tang (2009), despite 
arguing that the security dilemma of benign intentions is a very useful concept, offered no 
examples of it apart from, possibly, periods of the Cold War (p. 620). In other work, he 
suggested the intra-state examples of Moldova, Ukraine, and Czechoslovakia in 1989-90 and 
Rwanda in 1994 (Tang, 2011, p. 531). Yet these security dilemmas appear to simply be 
fleeting periods of state weakness in which (Tang judged) neither side had malign intentions, 
and which, as he described, quickly dissipated to become either hot conflicts, or stabilized. 
Meanwhile, Roe’s (2005) application to the Serb-Croat conflict is sharply disputed by Tang 
(2011, pp. 526-27), rather demonstrating the subjectivity of assessing intentions.  
Remarkably, these debates have not taken account of the fact that Butterfield (1951) 
himself—who is credited as establishing that “tragic,” inadvertent emphasis of the concept— 
acknowledged that a security of dilemma of benign intentions may never happen in reality. 
Despite his comment above regarding conflict caused “without any great criminals,” he also 
stated that such a situation may never exist because actors are never solely benign:  
In the complicated realm of historical events, no pattern ever appears in a pure and 
unadulterated form—and certainly, when a diplomatic issue is presented to us for 
resolution, we can never say that both sides are exactly balanced in point of morality, 
exactly equal in the virtues of their leading statesmen. The original issue may be 
aggravated and greatly intensified by the aggressiveness of a politician in one country 
or the barbarianism of a regime in another country. (pp. 27-28) 
Further, in describing the security dilemma, Butterfield called it an “imaginary specimen 
case” (p. 17), “hypothetical” (p. 20), and presented in its “optimum setting” (p. 19). This 
important qualification appears to have been overlooked by writers who have believed 
themselves to be remaining faithful to Butterfield’s supposed version of the security 
dilemma.  
Thus, the security dilemma, defined as a set of circumstances in which actors stumble 
innocently into confrontation due to misinterpretation of each other’s intentions, is 




correct in their stark conclusion regarding the “irrelevance” of that formulation. Like Tang, 
they were sharply critical of those who have departed from the security dilemma of benign 
intentions and used the term in more expansive ways. However, these critics overstate the 
“purity” of the original formulation and undervalue what the expansions and developments 
have sought to reveal about conflict.  
The Security Dilemma as a “Moment” or First Cause 
Aside from the debate surrounding intentions, another definitional question, again 
permitted by looseness in the pioneer writings, attends to whether the security dilemma is a 
spiral of escalation, or solely a predicament—a dilemma. Tang (2009) rejected versions of 
the concept that include the spiral. The spiral, in his view, should be regarded as one possible 
outcome of the dilemma: “a security dilemma can be transformed into a spiral when one or 
both sides become malign” (pp. 617-618). The difficulties with defining how, and assessing 
when, an actor “becomes malign” are clear from the discussion above. Furthermore, Tang’s 
own work displays an inability to maintain a clear distinction between the dilemma and the 
spiral. Later he stated that a “benign” security dilemma can be “exacerbated into a vicious or 
deep security dilemma ... by the self-reinforcing cycle of action and counteraction” (p. 618) 
—suggesting a spiral has already begun and is part of the security dilemma. In a footnote, he 
admitted that “there is a grey area between a ‘deep’ security dilemma and a spiral, and this 
may make it difficult to differentiate the two in practice” (p. 618). It is confusing to note, 
included in his initial definition of the security dilemma was “a vicious cycle” and a “self-
reinforcing or positive feedback mechanism” (p. 594).  
 Booth and Wheeler (2008) also wished to assert the distinction between the dilemma 
and spiral. In a departure from most other writers, they argued that the “security dilemma” 
should be viewed, not as a conflict caused despite benign intentions, but as the universal 
strategic predicament faced by actors regarding the unknowable intentions of others under 
conditions of anarchy. The security dilemma, they say, must be a dilemma. A spiral of 
hostility may be an unintended result from how actors answer that dilemma, but that spiral is 
different to the original predicament. To make clear the difference, Booth and Wheeler call 
the spiral a “security paradox” (p. 9). 
This is a coherent distinction but, in any case, most other writers use “security 
dilemma” differently—as clearly shown by Booth and Wheeler (2008), who quoted a sample 
of seven works that describe the security dilemma as synonymous with the action-reaction 
dynamic, driven by moves intended to increase security but which have the opposite effect (p. 




to a “security dilemma spiral” (p. 117) and Woodward (1999), who wrote of the “security 
dilemma and its spiralling behaviour” (p. 80).  
The significance of this debate is twofold. First, the considerable number of scholars 
who use the security dilemma in a way that encompasses or is synonymous with the spiral 
suggests that it is this capacity to capture the dynamic of reciprocity that is most distinctive in 
analysing conflict, regardless of whether this use is strictly consistent with the meaning of the 
word “dilemma.” Second, this debate impinges on what the security dilemma can do: is it 
explanatory—a cause of conflict—or merely descriptive of how conflict proceeds? Visser 
and Duyvesteyn (2014, p. 72) argued that the “original theory stipulates that it should be 
applied to the period preceding conflict to claim explanatory value.” For this reason, they 
criticized Kaufman (1996), and Snyder and Jervis (1999), for suggesting that 
violence/hatred/manipulation can initiate a security dilemma; the security dilemma, used 
properly, should be the cause of violence and hostility.  
However, as Visser and Duyvesteyn (2014) further noted, the idea of a pure, causal 
and explanatory security dilemma “moment” in intra-state conflict, straight after state 
collapse (suggested especially in the work of Tang and mentioned above—see Tang, 2011,  
p. 530) involving uncertainty and innocent actor intentions, is not credible. State collapse will 
at least in part be the result of enmity, not something that is exogenous to group competition. 
Ethnic conflicts have long histories of multiple phases which “render it difficult to determine 
the exact moment of anarchy and the main outburst of violence the security dilemma is 
supposed to explain” (Visser & Duyvesteyn, 2014, p. 81). As discussed above, groups 
construe others’ intentions based on hostile mutual pasts, meaning that there is little 
likelihood of a period, however short, after state collapse in which actors hold solely 
defensive and benign intentions.  
There is another point about causation to be made, unacknowledged by Visser and 
Duyevstyn and Tang. The action-reaction spiral does help explain the actions of actors who 
are in that situation, and how conflicts escalate. Each actor’s move is partly caused by—is a 
response to—the action of the other, and each actor’s move is a quest for some conception of 
security. All actions are, to some degree, reactions. As the next section elaborates, this is the 





The Security Dilemma as a Cycle of Insecurity 
In summary, a strict definition of the security dilemma that gives a causal role for 
anarchy/uncertainty and benign intentions in conflict, is not viable. Furthermore, the spiral 
has remained central to many understandings of the security dilemma and has considerable 
descriptive and explanatory value. This points towards the most compelling construction of 
the security dilemma: as an illustration of the mutuality, intersubjectivity, and reciprocity of 
conflict. The security dilemma models the relational dynamic inherent in all conflict—the 
cycle of insecurity. In this dynamic, rival actors’ identities and postures are mutually 
reinforcing and their quests for exclusively defined conceptions of security are cyclical and 
self-defeating. Indeed, exposing this dynamic is the clear purpose of Butterfield’s (1951) 
original reflection on the dilemma—showing how international actors can fail to see how 
their own actions shape the apparent belligerence of others. He likened the predicament of 
international actors to a “Chinese finger puzzle,” a small bamboo cylinder which, when 
placed on a finger from each hand, only gets tighter as the hands try to pull out. Entrapment is 
caused by the opposing but interdependent activity of both parties (p. 21). 
Through a reappraisal of the security dilemma literature, supplemented with 
scholarship from outside International Relations, the cycle of insecurity which characterizes 
conflict may be brought into focus according to three interlocking elements: an environment 
of structural uncertainty; the interdependence of group identities; and the escalating and self-
perpetuating mechanisms of the cycle.  
Uncertainty 
First, despite disagreements, the security dilemma and surrounding debate has 
highlighted the central role of structural uncertainty in conflict. The structural anarchy of the 
international state system has been regarded as the main enabling condition of the security 
dilemma (Knutsen, 2016; Herz, 1950). The uncertainty generated by the absence of a 
sovereign is compounded by the inherent ambiguity of weapons, useable for both defense or 
attack, or indeed, both, if offense is judged as the best defense. Arms are “the violent 
materiality of the existential condition of uncertainty” (Booth & Wheeler, 2008, p. 42). Even 
if an actor is sure of the other’s benign intentions in the present, this does not necessarily 
remove insecurity since “no matter how much decision makers are committed to the status 
quo, they cannot bind themselves and their successors to the same path” (Jervis, 1978, p. 
168). Posen (1993) shifted this analysis to the intra-state level. He argued that the demise of a 
strong state can create an anarchic, sovereign-less situation analogous to the anarchy of the 




international system. Without central authority, groups are unable to credibly commit that 
they will not exploit each other, and mutual fear drives them towards provocative 
preparations for war (Lake & Rothchild, 1998; Fearon, 1998).  
 We have seen the problems with ascribing the primary cause of conflict to 
anarchy/state collapse. The crucial roles of social-psychological dynamics, cultural narratives 
and individual emotions in inter-group conflict have now been considerably explored (inter 
alia, Volkan, 1997; Kaufman, 2001; Petersen, 2002; Ross, 2007). However, Posen was 
clearly making a valuable contribution when he invoked the security dilemma to highlight the 
real and powerful gravitational pull exerted by environmental uncertainty on actors’ 
behaviour, one which had so recently and vividly been exemplified in the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia, one of his case studies. Even Kaufman (1996), who in the main focused on 
“symbolic politics” and social-psychological factors, acknowledged the important permissive 
role of an uncertain environment for what he called an “ethnic security dilemma”: “structural 
conditions do matter ... there must, among other things, be a de facto situation of anarchy”  
(p. 112). It should be added that environmental uncertainty need not manifest itself in total 
state collapse. State weakness is sufficient in driving people to seek security within the in-
group (Roe, 2005, p. 66). 
The cycle of insecurity, therefore, both contributes to and is facilitated by, an anarchic 
environment, and is driven at least in part from groups’ fears—both real and imagined—for 
safety and their self-interested calculations that they must take their security into their own 
hands in the absence of a strong state. Insecurity, and the emotions, cultural stories, and 
symbols that interpret that insecurity, exist in a circular relationship: insecurity makes 
oppositional cultural understandings salient, while behaviour based on oppositional cultural 
interpretations of insecurity deepens or hastens the reality of insecurity.  
The Interdependence of Group Identities 
Secondly, the security dilemma spiral cogently expresses how conflicts are not only 
shaped by group identity, but shape group identity, in the direction of strong in-group 
solidarity, exclusivity and polarization. For instance, Mitzen (2006, p. 341) wrote of an 
“ontological security dilemma.” Smith (2006) pointed to the desire to protect “cultural 
security,” while Posen (1993, p. 31) referred to how “arming ideologically” can threaten 
another group and trigger a response. The most comprehensive account is Roe’s (2005) 
“inter-societal security dilemma.” He outlined how groups get locked in a spiral of mutual 
provocation in search of, not primarily military superiority, but of identity security, or 




military threats but may also take the form of demographic decline, cultural stagnation, or 
revivals and assertions of a rival culture. Responses to those threats are likely to consist of 
cultural or ethnic nationalist mobilization, thus setting in train an action-reaction dynamic 
which may lead to violence. Roe (2005, p. 69) wrote, “For the societal security dilemma, the 
action-reaction process can therefore be conceived in terms of escalating nationalisms” 
(emphasis added).  
Such identity polarization has grounding in constructivist sociology which 
understands self-concepts as evolving through interaction and relationship (Wendt, 1992). 
Cognately, the escalation of group identities is explained by social identity theory’s insights 
on how individual self-esteem is dependent on perceived relative group worth (Tajfel, 1982). 
In the zero-sum identity game, the only way for “us” to be ourselves is to make it harder for 
“them” to be themselves, and the offense/defense distinction is fully blurred. Deindividuation 
and dehumanization deepen through negative interaction, and “hostile perceptions and goals 
are accentuated by group discussion and tend to become group norms” (Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 
1994, p. 90). Other foundations for this kind of rivalry are found in psychoanalytic ideas, 
including Freud’s “narcissism of minor differences” (Ignatieff, 1998, p. 49; Volkan, 1997,         
p. 108) and Girard’s theories of mimetic, imitative desire, and scapegoating (Girard, 1988).  
At times of imminent threat, identity differentiation is accelerated. This is what Kuran 
(1998, p. 35) calls “ethnic dissimilation.” During spiralling insecurity, solidarity with the 
collective and rejection of the out-group come to be regarded as the surest ways to preserve 
safety, while at the same time identity is deliberately securitized by leaders who offer 
themselves as the best defenders of the group. Like the Chinese finger puzzle, identities 
become locked in mutually reinforcing enmity. In fact, as is captured succinctly in 
Nietzsche’s aphorism quoted as the epigraph of this article, actors become attached to that 
competitive relationship because of the clarity of purpose and identity it affords. Part of this 
is the appeal of war in satisfying cultural constructions of ideal masculinity (Sjoberg, 2014). 
Overall, the familiarity of conflict and an antagonistic relationship is preferred to the crisis of 
identity—the “ontological insecurity” and “peace anxieties” (Rumelili, 2015)—that would 
result from forming a new relationship.  
The Self-Perpetuation Dynamic 
Thirdly, the security dilemma spiral captures the in-built self-perpetuating capacity of 
conflict. Snyder and Jervis (1999, p. 23) wrote that when the expectation that others will 
defect takes hold, “the security dilemma can take on a life of its own, trapping both predators 




uncertain environment simply recreate insecurity in a self-reinforcing loop. Relevant here is 
Bilgic’s (2013) use of Booth and Wheeler’s (2008, p. 10) three a priori “logics of insecurity,” 
or ways of thinking about the uncertainty of international politics. These are fatalist (“the idea 
that insecurity can never be escaped in international politics”), mitigator (“the idea that 
insecurity can be ameliorated for a time, but not eliminated”), and transcender (“the idea that 
human society on a global scale can become what it wants to be and is not determined”). A 
fatalist orientation to an uncertain political environment will reproduce and perpetuate that 
very environment, manifesting itself in security policies that disregard and demonize the 
other group, heightening the threat and uncertainty faced by all (Bilgic, 2013, p. 197). As 
Booth and Wheeler (2008, p. 170) commented of “offensive Realism,” the fatalist strategy 
par excellence, it is “a self-fulfilling prophecy, a self-replicating prescription and a self-
confirming theory.”  
Social psychologists have identified several self-confirmatory mechanisms that 
characterize such fatalist mindsets and sustain conflictual cycles of interaction between 
individuals and between groups. These include “rationalisation,” “selective perception,” and 
“attributional distortion” (see Rubin, Pruitt & Kim, 1994, pp. 100-116). Simply, “negative 
beliefs validate negative feelings, and negative feelings make negative beliefs seem right”   
(p. 100). At the same time, spirals of contentious behaviour lead to “entrapment” in which 
fighting becomes justified by past effort invested, rather than a realistic assessment of the 
chances of success (p. 112). A further self-propulsion force in conflict is the fact that the 
progress of violence generates additional contests and grievances, or “derivative issues,” 
related to the conduct of the disputants in the conflict as opposed to the original issues at 
stake (Oberschall, 2007, p. 30). Issue accumulation multiplies grievances and intensifies the 
parties’ resolve to continue war. None of this is to suggest that actors in conflict do not 
possess agency; as Biglic (2013) emphasized, actors may also choose to pursue their security 
according to the “mitigator” or “transcender” logics which can deescalate conflict. The point 
is to recognize the intense pressures exerted on actors to maintain conflictual patterns of 
behaviour.  
 This analysis shows how security dilemma theory can elucidate, in a vivid and 
comprehensive manner, a central dynamic and characteristic of conflict: the cycle of 
insecurity. The cycle is enabled by structural uncertainty. At the inter-state level, this is 
caused by the anarchy of the international system and at the intra-state level, by state 
weakness or failure; given that contemporary conflicts tend to have both civil and 




shapes, and is shaped by, interdependent and antagonistic group/actor identities. The cycle 
also possesses mechanisms—strategic rationales and psychological tendencies—that allow it 
to self-perpetuate, long after conflict has ceased to appear to be in the rational interests of the 
conflict parties. The next section demonstrates the form and relevance of this framework as a 
conflict analysis tool in a real conflict arena. 
The Case of Northern Ireland 
The conflict in Northern Ireland, known as “the Troubles,” comprised a thirty-year 
period of low intensity anti-state and inter-communal violence centring on both the 
constitutional status of Northern Ireland and the treatment of the main minority identity 
group. Much of the violence took place along a social–identity fault-line between majority 
pro-British and mainly Protestant “unionists,” and minority pro-Irish and mainly Roman 
Catholic “nationalists” or “republicans.” The Irish Republican Army (IRA) fought an armed 
insurgency against the state security forces aimed at forcing Northern Ireland out of the 
United Kingdom, while unionist paramilitary groups sought to counter the IRA. A peace 
process in the 1990s brought violence largely to an end and instituted a power-sharing 
government (see Cochrane, 2013). Though a variety of interpretations of the conflict existed 
(e.g., placing the blame on British colonialism or Irish insurgency), the view that the conflict 
was foremost a clash of ethno-national identities within Northern Ireland, albeit with 
transnational elements, became dominant in academic and policy circles during “the 
Troubles” (Whyte, 1991).  
The conflict will be analysed in accordance with the three elements of the cycle of 
insecurity—uncertainty, interdependent identities, and self-perpetuation. The purpose here is 
to illustrate the dimensions of the cycle of insecurity, as well as show the difficulties with 
much of the security dilemma literature that purports the existence of purely security-driven 
behaviour and of “first causes.” A further goal is to show the fruitfulness of a cycle of 
insecurity-guided analysis. Highly developed analytical approaches to the Northern Ireland 
conflict exist, including Wright’s (1987) “ethnic frontier” characterization, McGarry and 
O’Leary’s (1995) synthesis of “exogenous” and “endogenous” factors, and Ruane and Todd’s 
(1996) “system of relationships” theory. The approach below is in many ways 
complementary to these. However, there are two key virtues of the cycle of insecurity lens. 
One is that it highlights, not only structure, issues, or actors, but the dynamic progress and 
persistence of conflict, both in terms of everyday conflictual interactions and the long-term 




multiple causes—structural and environmental, social psychological, and self-generating 
factors.  
The importance of structural uncertainty and state collapse in much security dilemma 
theorising may explain why the case of Northern Ireland is virtually absent from the security 
dilemma literature. There was no wholesale breakdown in law and order during “the 
Troubles.” Violence was mostly contained to working-class districts, border areas, and the 
state security sector. Nevertheless, as noted above, state weakness is enough to drive identity 
groups to “self-help” in search of security, and a catalytic decline in state strength occurred at 
the beginning of “the Troubles” in the late 1960s (White, Owsiak, & Clarke, 2013, p. 233). 
This partly stemmed from the rising demographic, educational and economic strength of the 
nationalist minority in Northern Ireland, a minority traditionally alienated from that political 
entity which had been created in 1920 by the British to secure unionist ascendancy. This fed 
into nationalists’ campaign for civil rights which was interpreted by the dominant unionist 
community as a threat to the state.  
In the spiralling unrest, Catholics did not trust the unionist government or British state 
to advance their civil rights, and later, to maintain their physical security in the face of state 
violence such as Bloody Sunday (when the British Army killed thirteen unarmed people in 
Derry during protests in 1972) or unionist paramilitary attacks (Adams, 2003, p. xxxii). 
Similarly, “For loyalists [working-class unionists] the ‘failure’ of the state to quell the 
republican assault signalled state ‘insufficiency”’—and justified their violent activism 
(Shirlow, 2012, p. 28). Thus, in the environment of state weakness, both unionists and 
nationalists moved towards “self-help,” expressed in communal mobilisation, protest, and 
eventually armed action (Bew & Gillespie, 1999, pp. 1-19). 
Yet the Northern Ireland case clearly shows the invalidity of explaining civil conflict 
according to state collapse and rational security-seeking alone. As the discussion above made 
clear, state weakness creates permissive conditions for a cycle of insecurity, but that very 
weakness partly results from, is deepened by, and is interpreted through, the groups’ 
collective memories of past rivalry. Stewart (1977, p. 183) made the point by noting that 
although the political crisis and civil unrest at the start of “the Troubles” were caused by 
“tangible pressures and problems of the contemporary world” (such as demographic changes 
and civil rights movements in the United States and Europe), nevertheless, once the crisis was 
in motion, communal memory took effect to shape how events unfolded and were 
understood: “the civil population turned instinctively to the only source of wisdom applicable 




good and bad” (p. 185). Unionist and nationalist communities were, and still are, 
characterized by vibrant cultures of commemoration which annually mark distant events 
(such as, for unionists, the Battle of the Boyne in 1690 and the Battle of the Somme in 1916; 
for nationalists, the 1798 rebellion and the Easter Rising of 1916) which constitute 
interpretive paradigms for present challenges (McDowell & Braniff, 2014). In sum, memories 
of enmity meant that there was not, nor was there any possibility of, a period in the midst of 
state weakness in which the parties held benign and security-seeking intentions, before which 
they became malign—the possibility suggested by some writers on the security dilemma.    
 Throughout “the Troubles,” violent combat cannot be meaningfully ascribed a solely 
security-seeking motive, or said to be driven by benign intentions, regardless of the self-
justifications of armed actors. A defensive orientation to an oppressive colonial regime is at 
the centre of the republican self-image; republican leader Gerry Adams claimed to be fighting 
“an apartheid system” (Adams, 2003, p. xxx). Yet a defensive rationale has not withstood 
careful analysis (see English, 2003; Shanahan, 2009) or gained much credence beyond the 
core republican constituency. Unionist paramilitary strategies during the conflict, including 
indiscriminately targeting Catholic civilians, could not be classed in any serious analysis as 
defensive. Despite their presence being officially justified in terms of maintaining public 
order, state forces at times pursued repressive actions and policies which convinced sections 
of the nationalist minority that those forces’ purpose was not defense but subjugation. In all 
cases, the security-greed, defense-offense distinctions are of no analytical use. Rather, what 
matters is the (fatalist) means by which these actors pursued security.  
Regarding group identities, it was argued above that the security dilemma provokes 
consideration of them as constitutive of a relationship or system, rather than as distinct 
primordial entities—the view preferred by nationalists themselves (Ozimkirli, 2002, p. 67). In 
Northern Ireland, the identities of the main political blocs have been both mutually 
competitive and mutually defining—a fact rarely acknowledged by ethnic/nationalist 
entrepreneurs on either side. The zero-sum competition of Britishness and Irishness in Ireland 
is traceable to their emergence from Protestant and Catholic religious identities respectively, 
identities which were inherently conflictual (Elliott, 2009; Liechty & Clegg, 2001). These 
theological divisions were given political grounding in the clash between Protestant colonial 
settlers from Britain and the Catholic Irish in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
According to Ruane and Todd (2007), the victory of British Protestantism at the end of the 




…locked-in and partially fused a complex set of cultural oppositions (religious, 
ethnic, cultural, colonial) and created a situation where rational self-interest (for 
security or economic livelihood or influence) led individuals to band together as 
Protestants or as Catholics ... There were strong incentives for individuals to 
reproduce the pattern, and strong disincentives to step outside it. (pp. 448-449)  
This set the mould for an “inter-societal security dilemma” (Roe, 2005) as described earlier. 
Fixed into this system of relations, Catholic and Protestant identities came to be defined by 
suspicion, grievance, and mutual, negative stereotyping: “Irish Protestants’ and Irish 
Catholics’ sense of self was conditioned by their views of each other” (Elliott, 2009, p. 4). 
Centuries-old images (Catholics are subversive, disloyal, dishonest; Protestants are 
domineering, bigoted, oppressive) evolved in tandem, each supporting the other.  
The dynamics of mutual polarization and the mutually sustaining nature of 
antagonistic identities are evident throughout modern Irish history and remain in 
contemporary politics. At the start of “the Troubles,” the outbreak of uncertainty, threat, and 
violence, which was in part caused by historic inter-group enmity, led to a process of “ethnic 
dissimilation” (Kuran, 1998) which included major movements of population from mixed to 
single-identity areas in search of safety (Browne & Asprooth-Jackson, 2019). Group 
identities took on an unprecedented salience as combatants chose targets based on those 
identities. One unionist paramilitary leader commented as follows on his organization’s 
reasoning in the early 1970s: “The strategy was that if we killed enough Catholics, that would 
drive the IRA out ... it wasn’t about religion in the first instance, but still we picked a 
religious group of people because the IRA claimed to represent them” (Brewer, Mitchell, & 
Leavey, 2013, p. 61). The in-group became essential for security. 
At the same time, threats were exaggerated and manipulated by fatalist ethnic 
entrepreneurs. Another unionist paramilitary recalls responding to the call to action of Ian 
Paisley, the fundamentalist Protestant preacher and unionist politician, in the early 1970s (as 
cited in Brewer, Mitchell, & Leavey, 2013), “Well the IRA had went mad, attacking, 
bombing, shooting ... and you’ve Paisley coming around Rathcoole where I grew up saying 
we need to defend ourselves and stand up, and he’s a minister. So, you don’t need to coax a 
fifteen-year-old, you understand? So, you just say, ‘Well what do you want me to do? How 
do you join?”’ (p. 64). Paisley dramatically exemplifies the self-fulfilling feedback of the 
cycle of insecurity. His virulent opposition to efforts to address nationalists’ legitimate 
political grievances in the 1960s contributed to internecine violence and a radicalization 




biographer calls him a “self-fulfilling prophet” and “midwife” of the IRA, his own enemy 
(Moloney, 2008, pp. 514-515).  
All of this had a self-perpetuating dynamic—a further component of the cycle of 
insecurity as set out above. Indeed, although combatant groups continued to justify their fight 
in terms of their original political goals, the self-sustaining dynamic of violence was widely 
perceived, gaining expression in a collection of conflict clichés prevalent in political and 
popular discourse: “tit-for-tat,” “retaliation,” “zero-sum conflict,” and “whataboutery,” i.e., 
the deflection of responsibility by blaming similar actions by the other side (see Dunn & 
Dawson, 2000). Much of the violence was intended to avenge a previous attack, rather than 
further an overarching political strategy; one paramilitary leader called this approach 
“returning the serve” (David Ervine, as cited in Taylor, 1999, p. 126). Violence was reactive 
and belligerent responses to provocation were taken as evidence that the provocative 
approach was the correct one. Republican violence invited security force repression and 
confirmed unionist fears that the state was under existential threat; British state and unionist 
violence and intransigence demonstrated republican claims of unionist sectarianism and the 
“failure” of the Northern Ireland state. Continued fighting was also justified on the basis of 
past sacrifices; republicans were particularly concerned with honoring their dead through 
continued struggle (Shanahan, 2009). 
In the party political realm, the cycle of insecurity showed itself in “ethnic 
outbidding,” in which the most ardent advocates of each communal group mutually profited 
from fear of the other’s political growth and vitality, and moderate parties struggled to 
advance (Horowitz, 2000, p. 346). Even in the post-Agreement era of cross-community 
power-sharing, in the identity-based party system, each side still depends on, and encourages, 
fear of traditional opponents in order to maintain its vote. For instance, launching her party’s 
2017 election manifesto, the leader of the largest unionist party, the Democratic Unionist 
Party, warned unionists not to vote for the smaller unionist party, the Ulster Unionist Party, 
because “every vote for another unionist party is a vote which is lost in the battle to make 
sure that Sinn Féin does not win this election” (Belfast Telegraph, 2017). 
A full account of the peace process that emerged is not possible here; the 1998 Good 
Friday Agreement, brokered jointly by the British and Irish governments, contained a range 
of political, identity and security measures designed to contain the cyclical dynamics of the 
conflict and permit the “achievement of reconciliation, tolerance and mutual trust” and the 
“protection and vindication of the human rights of all” (Northern Ireland Office, 1998, p. 1). 




numerous disputes concerning aspects of peace implementation. Notably, the most 
destabilising issue—paramilitary disarmament—led to what the British minister responsible 
for Northern Ireland called “a Mexican standoff” (Peter Mandelson, as cited in Godson, 2004, 
p. 593) of mutually sustaining positions. The unionists’ slogan was “no guns, no government” 
(i.e., no power-sharing before the IRA gave up its weapons), while republicans demanded 
power-sharing first, after which, they argued, the IRA would be more inclined to disarm 
(Mitchell, 2015, pp. 60-70).  
This was a demonstration of Walter’s (1999, p. 43) observation that a peace 
agreement’s injunction to disarm can in fact perpetuate a spiral of mutual threat: what she 
calls a “security dilemma in the reverse.” Indeed, the structural uncertainty that enables the 
cycle of insecurity is, when an agreement is signed, not ended but recreated since proposed 
institutions are untested, military and political defense mechanisms are in line for 
dismantling, and parties are yet to prove that they will keep faith with commitments. All of 
this is conducive to sustaining intense group insecurity (Paris, 2004, p. 173). In Northern 
Ireland, significantly, the challenges of implementation were not primarily caused by the 
institutional and constitutional issues (about which combatants were ostensibly fighting) but 
derivative security/legacy of violence issues (disarmament, prisoner releases, police reform, 
transitional justice), i.e., the relational grievances that accumulated during the conflict as a 
result of the violent strategies of actors. 
While the weapons issue was largely resolved when the IRA destroyed its arsenal in 
2005, Northern Ireland continues to be affected by the self-perpetuating dynamics of conflict 
in which both sides are unwilling to depart from longstanding, mutually-antagonizing, 
positions. This is particularly evident in the failure to “deal with the past” and implement 
transitional justice measures. Parties oppose any measure which may confer legitimacy on the 
past violence of their opponents. Two examples, current at the time of writing, are 
republicans’ opposition to a “statute of limitation” that would make British military personnel 
immune from prosecution for alleged crimes committed in Northern Ireland (Sinn Féin, 
2019) and unionists’ opposition to pensions for people injured during the conflict if the 
scheme includes paramilitary perpetrators (Democratic Unionist Party, 2018).  
Conclusion 
This article has shown how security dilemma theory can provide an inclusive and 
flexible analytical tool that reveals the cyclical nature of conflict, how the cycle is enabled 
and proceeds, and what is its impact. The article has challenged overly restrictive 




the concept is as a model of the cycle of insecurity, that is, the relational dynamic in conflict 
in which actors’ coercive moves for security simply sustain their insecurity. Foregrounding 
the cycle of insecurity in the analysis of conflict has both scholarly and practice/policy 
significance.  
For the analyst approaching a conflict, it highlights a number of crucial areas of 
enquiry: the nature of the insecure environment facing actors and how they have contributed 
to its creation; the reasons for actors’ particular responses to insecurity (for instance, 
according to fatalist, mitigator, and transcender logics); the ways in which actors’ orientations 
to their insecurity are a reaction to the behaviour of others; and how actors’ strategies and 
identities are shaped by their relationship, rather than solely generated within a hermetically 
sealed group culture/history. Eschewing dichotomies between structural and individual 
explanations, or the objective and subjective, the cycle of insecurity approach integrates the 
environmental realities which enable the cycle and the social psychological factors which 
drive and are impacted by the cycle, as well as taking account of the self-perpetuating 
mechanisms which give conflict, as Snyder and Jervis (1999) put it, “a life of its own.” 
In terms of peace practice, it is beyond the scope of this article to examine in detail 
prescriptions for the cycle of insecurity, but the analysis here at least shows the scale and 
multidimensionality of the task. The Northern Ireland case contains both good ideas and 
cautionary tales. On the one hand, some astute and mostly effective means were employed to 
assuage genuine security fears and reduce the scope for group leaders to claim betrayal, 
unfair treatment, or that peace implementation threatened their security. These included 
referring difficult issues (such as police reform, disarmament, monitoring paramilitary 
activity, adjudicating on controversial cultural parades) to credible, independent commissions 
(see Walsh, 2017), creating equitable political institutions, and choreographing public 
concessions to convey the sense of balanced de-escalation (see Dixon, 2018). On the other 
hand, power-sharing has had mixed success, to some extent bearing out the warning of 
Snyder and Jervis (1999, p. 19) that it may reify the contending groups and “perpetuates the 
mutual interdependencies and vulnerabilities that heighten the security dilemma.”  
In any case, it may broadly be emphasized that this article’s analysis shows the 
imperative of both tackling anarchy and uncertainty through building consensus-based 
political structures and social justice and encouraging relational restoration between 
individuals and groups through reconciliation initiatives. Regarding the latter, the cycle of 
insecurity offers a valuable peace education and conflict analysis tool for political elites and 




Self in sustaining that system: through nurturing an identity defined by a conflictual 
relationship with an Other, and by pursuing policies which perpetuate the insecurity of others 
and justify their hostility. Awareness of the strictures of the cycle can help develop the 
agency to transcend them; this is what Booth and Wheeler (2008) call “security dilemma 
sensibility,” i.e., the ability to be self-aware, recognize how one may be contributing to 
opponents’ fears, and act to assuage them. Those authors write that this sensibility “is so 
fundamental to statecraft that it should be in the toolbox of all decision-makers and policy 
advisers; and it should be part of the educational project of everybody’s survival research”  
(p. 296). A security dilemma perspective on the troubled Northern Ireland peace process, 
therefore, suggests that the failure to embed the ideals and principles of the 1998 Agreement 
is in part due to an insufficient level of this kind of peace agency.  
 Finally, an objection to foregrounding the cyclical, mutual nature of conflict may be 
that it draws an equivalence of culpability. Jervis (2001, p. 38) suggests that the security 
dilemma is a “no fault” argument since if both sides merely seek defense, then neither is to 
blame. Does recognizing the cycle of insecurity lead to a “both fault” conclusion, which in 
essence amounts to “no fault”? There is no reason why recognizing the mutual and cyclical 
dynamics of conflict precludes also recognizing asymmetry in power, or asymmetry in 
suffering, or that a sustainable peace may demand greater concessions from one side than the 
other. Nevertheless, in Butterfield’s description of the security dilemma, his main target is 
clearly the mutually sustaining hubris and self-righteousness of actors in conflict, mindsets 
which prevented them from entering “the other man’s counter fear” (Butterfield, 1951, p. 21). 
The capacity for a clear view of Self, to view the cycle from the other actor’s vantage point, 
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